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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case under §782a-3(2) (d), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

NATURE OF H*OC£EDINGS BEIOW
On January 6, 1989, the Third Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake
County, Salt Lake City Department, Judge Floyd H. Gowans presiding, found
Glenn R. Haws guilty of the Class A misdemeanor of making false statements
to the Department of Ertployment Security (hereinafter "DES") kncwing them
to be false, and kncwingly failing to disclose material facts to DES, to
obtain or increase a benefit under the unemployment compensation laws of
the State of Utah, in violation of §35-4-19(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended.

On February 8, 1989, Judge Gowans imposed a fine of $250.00

and sentenced Haws to a jail term of 90 days but suspended the jail term on
certain terms of probation. Haws appeals this final order.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

What elements should the State of Utah have to establish in

order to convict a claimant of the crime of

fraudulently

obtaining

unenployment coropensation benefits?
2.

What mental

state must

the prosecution

prove

a

claimant

possessed in order to convict such claimant of the crime of fraudulently
obtaining unemployment comopensation benefits?
3.

What evidence must the prosecution present to establish the

presence of the requisite mental state?

1

Is proof of what any claimant

should have kncwn sufficient to establish what the claimant charged
actually did knew, despite such claimant's uncontroverted testimony as to
\/diat he actually did knew?
4.

Was the evidence insufficient to establish that Haws possessed

the required mental state, i.e., that he actually knew that he was supposed
to report his ongoing part-time work on the bi-weekly claim cards and
knowingly failed to do so?

STATUTES WHOSE INIEE^FRETATIC^I IS DETERMINATIVE
§35-4-19(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended:
(a)

Whoever makes

a

false

statement

or

representation knewing it to be false or knewingly
fails to disclose a material fact, to obtain or
increase any benefit or other payment under this
act or under the Unerrployment Compensation Law of
any state or of the Federal Government, either for
himself or for any other person, is guilty of a
Class A misdemeanor; a fine imposed shall be not
less than $50.00 and a penalty of imprisonment
shall be for not longer than 60 days.

Each false

statement or representation or failure to disclose
a material fact constitutes a separate offense.

STATEMENT OF TEE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case arises out of an application and biweekly claim cards

2

filed by

Glenn R.

Haws with the

Department

of

Employment

Security

(hereinafter "DES") in late 1986 and early 1987 to obtain unemployment
compensation benefits.

In mid-1986 Haws was working at both a full-time

job and a part-time job.

When, in September 1986 he lost his full-time

job, he kept working at his regular part-time job.
application for unemployment benefits.

He thereafter filed an

There is no dispute that even

though at the time Haws filed this application for benefits he was still
working

part-time

he

was

nevertheless

entitled

to

some

amount

of

unerrployment benefits for a period of twenty-six weeks.
When Haws
benefits

filed his application and biweekly claim cards for

in late 1986 and early 1987 he had the understanding, new

admittedly mistaken, that he did not need to report his continuing work at
his regular part-time job on the claim forms.

Accordingly, in filling out

the biweekly claim forms, he did not report his ongoing part-time work.
Had he reported his ongoing part-time work he would have received $1,500
less in benefits.

Thus, his failure to report resulted in an overpayment

of benefits of approximately $1,500.00.
In September 1987, DES determined via an administrative hearing that
Haws had received excess unenployitient benefits.
back all

DES required Haws to pay

of the benefits he had received and assessed a penalty.

Haws

agreed to repay all the benefits and the penalty and began making the
repayments.
Approximately one year later and with Haws making the repayments,
DES referred the matter to the Salt Lake County Attorney for prosecution
under § 35-4-19(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
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B.

THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On November 16, 1988, Rex Reeder, a DES investigator, swore out an
information against Mr. Haws charging him with violations of §35-4-19(a),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

(Record - 1) On December 23, 1988,

Haws plead not guilty.
Trial was held on January 3, 1989, before Judge Floyd H. Gowans.
(Record-86)

C.

THE DISPOSITION IN THE COURT RETfW

On January 6, 1989, Judge Gowans announced the decision of the
court. Judge Gowans referred to the fact that during the process of filing
for unemployment compensation benefits Haws had access to and was exposed
to a booklet prepared by DES entitled "Unertployment Insurance Claimant
Guide".

Judge Gowans determined that because Haws was exposed to the

booklet, Haws "should

have had that ccxtplete understating", that is, the

complete understanding to report his ongoing part-time work to DES.

The

court determined that Haws' exposure to the booklet should have created
such an understanding in Haws' mind "irrespective of what any individual
may have said to

[him] during the course of [his] dealings with the

Department". (Record-85, page 2)
With respect to Haws7 testimony that during the process of applying
for benefits he had had a conversation with a DES representative who had
told him that he did not need to report his ongoing part-time work for
Bonneville Estates on the biweekly claim cards and that Haws had acted in
accordance with and in reliance on such instruction, the court did not make
a specific finding:

"Now, whether there was some miscxmirnunication between

4

you and this person, either on your part or her part, of course, the Court
cannot answer." (R-85, pages 2,3)
Thus, the Court determined that even assuming the Haws7 testimony
about his conversation with a DES representative which resulted in his
mistaken understanding of what he needed to report was truthful:
"it would appear from these entries that the Court had
read from this booklet, that it would have
have been perfectly

or should

clear to you that you must report

that information for future consideration." (R-85, page
3)
In effect, the Court held that the DES7 proof of what anyone
receiving the DES booklet or reading the questions on the biweekly claim
cards should have realized established that Haws actually did knew what to
do and knowingly failed to do so and the Court found Haws "guilty as
charged." (R-85, page 3)

D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

In late summer 1986, Glenn R. Haws lost his full-time job with

Lawrence Construction Co.

At the time he also worked part-time for

Bonneville Estates and after he lost his full-time job he continued to work
part-time for Bonneville Estates.

(Record-86, pages 35, 48, State Exhibit

#1, R-30)
2.
Utah

On September 30, 1986, Glenn R. Haws visited the offices of the

Department

of Errployment

Security

to apply

for unemployment

compensation benefits. (R-86, pages 35-36, 46, State Exhibit #1, R-30)
3.

During this visit, DES gave him an application entitled "Claim
5

for Unemployment Benefits". (R-86, pages 36, 46, State Erfiibit #1, R-30)
DES also gave Haws a computer printout which shewed that Haws was working
part-time for Bonneville Estates.

DES asked Haws if he was still working

for Bonneville Estates and Haws indicated that he was still working there
on a part-time basis. (R-86, pages 36, 48)
4.

Haws completed the application for benefits and gave it to DES.

(R-86, pages 6, 13, 36, State Ex. #1, R-30)
5.

DES

gave Haws

Claimant Guide".

a

booklet

entitled

''Uhenployment

Insurance

(R-86, pages 6, 13, 22, 46-47, State Exhibit #4, R-37)

Haws read most of the booklet while he was at the Job Service office. (R86, page 47)
6.

DES also shewed Haws a 15 minute video presentation. (R-86,

pages 13, 20-22, 36, 46-47).
7.

IXiring the course of watching the video, Haws became confused

as to vrtiether he needed to report his ongoing part-time work at Bonneville
Estates on the bi-weekly claim cards. (R-86, pages 36, 37, 46-47, 48)
8.
claimant

At the end of the video, a DES r^resentative requested each
to meet

for

a

few minutes with

a

DES

representative

for

instructions on how to fill out the bi-weekly claim cards. When Haws' name
was called, Haws met with a DES representative, a woman vfacm Haws remembers
as being black and heavy set but whom Haws has since not been able to
positively or conclusively identify.

During this conversation, the DES

representative explained hew Haws should fill out the bi-weekly claim
cards.

She mentioned that Haws was to report any earnings he had. At that

point Haws asked the representative whether the fact that he was still
working part-time for Bonneville Estates was considered in determining his
6

eligibility for benefits and the amount he would be receiving.
representative responded that it was.

The

Haws then asked, if that was the

case, did he still need to report that ongoing part-time work.

The

representative responded that he did not need to, which Haws understood to
mean that because DES was aware (as evidenced by the DES cranputer printout)
that he was still working at his part-time job, he just needed to report
earnings from other work he obtained while seeking full-time employment.
Haws left the DES offices with the impression that he did not need to
report his earnings from his continuing and ongoing part-time work with
Bonneville Estates, just any other work. (R-86, pages 20, 21, 26, 29, 3739, 40-43, 48, 49)
9.

For the week starting October 4, 1986, continuing through April

11, 1987, Haws filled out bi-weekly claim cards consistent with his
understanding.

Because of his impression that he did not need to report

his ongoing part-time work at Bonneville Estates, he did not report this
part-time work at Bonneville Estates on the bi-weekly claim cards.

The

only exception to this pattern occurred during the week of November 1, 1986
When Haws donated labor to help a family move.

Haws reported this donated

labor on the bi-weekly claim form. (R-86, pages 7-8, 9, 38-39, 42-43, State
Exhibit #2, R-16-29, State Exhibit #3, R-31-32)
10.

Haws received benefits for the weeks of October 4, 1986 to

April 11, 1987, totaling the amount of $4,728.

This resulted in an

overpayment of $1,514.00.
11.

In a hearing held on September 11, 1987, a DES hearings officer

found that Haws had violated §35-4-5 (e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that he had knowingly withheld material information to receive
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benefits to which he was not entitled. (R-86, pages 16, 40, 43)
12.

The hearings officer ordered Haws to repay all benefits Haws

actually received ($4,728.00), and imposed an overpayment penalty in an
amount equal to the actual overpayment ($1,514.00). (R-86, pages 16, 43-44)
13.

Haws did not appeal the hearing officer7s ruling. (R-86, page

14.

Foliating receipt of the hearing officer's decision, Haws

18)

signed a DES Installment Agreement wherein he agreed to repay the above
sums to DES at the rate of approximately $200.00 a month.

From October 20,

1987 to November 1988, Haws repaid approximately $1,045.98 to DES.

(R-86,

pages 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 44, Defense Exhibit #1, R-33-36)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
To convict a claimant of the crime of unemployment fraud the
prosecution must establish that the claimant had a specific and definite
mens rea, i.e., that the accused made a false statement knowing it to be
false or failed to disclose material information he knew he was supposed to
disclose.
explanation

The prosecution must prove this mens rea by more than just an
of what

a

reasonable

claimant

should

have known.

The

prosecution must prove this mens rea by means other than just proof of the
claimant's act of submitting of a false statement or the failure to
disclose material

information.

The prosecution must prove that the

claimant charged actually knew what to do and knowingly failed to do so.
In this case, the prosecution's proof of what DES believes any
claimant such as Haws should have known does not establish vAiat Haws
actually did know.

The evidence was insufficient to establish that Haws
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made

false statements knowing them to be

false.

The evidence was

insufficient to establish that Haws knowingly failed to disclose material
facts. Absent such evidence, the trial court's verdict cannot stand.

ARGUMENT
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
In State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
announced a new standard to guide its review of bench trials in criminal
cases.

Prior to Walker, in criminal cases tried either to a jury or to the

bench, the appellate court/s ability to reverse the verdict was limited to
that narrow spectrum of cases vfliere "the evidence is so lacking and
insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have reached that verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt", State v. Isaacson, 704 P. 2d 555, 557 (Utah
1985).

In Walker, the Supreme Court announced that henceforth it would

set aside the trial court's verdict in a criminal case if the verdict was
clearly erroneous, e.g., if the clear weight of the evidence required a
different verdict or if, in reviewing the evidence, the appellate court
reached a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 743
P. 2d 191,193.

The Supreme Court explained that it would find the trial

court to have made a mistake if the trial court held an erroneous view of
the applicable law which resulted in the conviction or if the evidence did
not adequately support the conviction:
It may regard a finding as clearly
erroneous only if the finding is without
adequate evidentiary support or
induced

by

an

erroneous

view of

the

law.

(emphasis added.)
743 P. 2d 191, 193 (quoting Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure

9

S2585 f 1971).

See also State v. Wright. 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987).

State v. Harman, 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah App. 1989).
As set forth above, the trial court apparently believed that proof
of What any claimant such as Haws should have known together with proof of
what Haws did satisfied the statute. As set forth belcw, the trial court's
view or interpretation of the law was erroneous.

Haws submits the trial

court's conviction of Haws was clearly erroneous in that the trial court
held an erroneous view of what types of evidence could establish the
required mental state and satisfy the statute. The trial court's erroneous
view of governing legal principles directly resulted in Haws' conviction on
less than adequate evidence.

II. EROSECOTION FOR THE CRIME OF UNEMPIDYMENT
FRAUD CALLS FOR DIFFERENT ELEMENTS AND A HIGHER STANDARD
Haws recognizes that in the civil or administrative context there is
no requirement that the State prove a claimant's mens rea in order to find
that

the

claimant

interpreting

committed

§35-4-5 (e) and

fraud.

See e.g.,

the

DES

Regulations

§35-4-6(d), Utah Code Annotated

1953, as

amended. R-475-5e-2/ R-475-6d, Utah Administrative Code, 1987-88.
The Utah

Supreme

Court has

repeatedly

held

in

reviewing DES

administrative actions assessing disqualifications or overpayment penalties
that if a claimant makes a claim containing false statements, then the
Court will find an inherent intent to defraud.

Mineer v. Board of Review,

572 P. 2d 1364, 1366 (Utah 1977), Martinez v. Industrial Commission, 576
P.2d 1295 (Utah 1978), Millett v. Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 946 (Utah
1980), Taylor v. Department of Employment Security, 647 P. 2d 1 (Utah 1982).
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DES and the Court will find such an intent to defraud regardless of
the claimant's actual mental state.

See, e.g. f Diprizio v. Industrial

Commission, 572 P. 2d 679 (Utah 1977) (Italian immigrant \*/ho failed to
report earnings because of difficulty with English language assessed
overpayment penalty); Whitney v. Board of Review, 585 P.2d 780 (Utah 1978)
(claimant who understated income on grounds of emotional and mental illness
nevertheless assessed an overpayment penalty); Richmond v. Department of
Employment Security, 666 P. 2d 313 (Utah 1983) (claimant who was confused
about vtfiether draws or future commissions constituted compensation assessed
an overpayment penalty); Slincrer v. Board of Review, 733 P. 2d 122 (Utah
1987) (claimant who failed to report earnings from National Guard duty
under self-created mistaken view that such earnings could be averaged over
the four weeks of a month instead of reported on a weekly basis assessed an
overpayment penalty).

Indeed, the elements of unemployment fraud in the

administrative arena approach strict liability.1
1

A recent case involving a charge of unemployment compensation fraud
at the administrative level, Mayes v. Department of Employment Security,
754 P.2d 989 (Utah App. 1988) bears some similarity to the facts of the
case at hand:
When plaintiff first filed his claim for unemployment
insurance benefits, he received
a booklet
from the Department
which explained that claimants should fully answer all
questions on the weekly claim form and indicate all work
hours and the total amount of earnings for each week.
Plaintiff also attended an orientation
session
where he and
other claimants were advised that they would remain eligible
for benefits while working on a part-time basis. They were
told that income from part-time work would reduce their
unemployment benefits but that they would remain eligible for
benefits for a longer period of time. Plaintiff claims
he

understood the oral instructions given during the orientation
meeting to mean that he had the option of reporting or not
reporting part-time work and earnings.
He attributed his
failure to report work and earnings to his belief that he
could elect not to report such information. He contends
that

11

In a prosecution for the crime of unemployment fraud the Utah
Criminal Code and the fundamental policies behind the statute require
different elements and a higher standard,

A criminal prosecution requires

proof of a specific and definite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.

III.

FRDSECUTTCN FOR THE CRIME OF UNByEPIDYMENT FRAUD REQUIRES
FRDOF OF THE QJLPABIE MENTAL STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

The Utah Criminal Code follows the fundamental ccxnmon law principle
that in order for a person to be found guilty of a criitdnal offense, the
prosecuting authorities must shew that the accused possessed a certain
criminal state of mind.

§ 76-2-102, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,

requires that, "Every offense ... shall require a culpable mental state."
The only exception are crimes involving strict liability, not applicable
here.2

this opinion was formed on the basis of information
provided
by a Department representative
during the orientation
session
which he and others attended in April 1985. (emphasis added)
754 P.2d 989,991.
Based on this opinion, Mayes did not report that he was working
part-time for a company on any of the claim forms he filed with DES.
DES assessed Mayes with an overpayment penalty. The Board of Review
affirmed and Mayes appealed to this Court.
This Court held the Board of Review had erred in an evidentiary
ruling, reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case. Thus, this
Court did not reach the issues at the heart of the Maves case, i.e.,
whether Mayes mistaken view of what he needed to report was a defense to
the charge. The instant case presents this same issue in the context of a
criminal proceeding.
2,,

An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining
the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal
responsibility for conmission of the conduct prohibited by the statute

without requiring

proof of any culpable

mental state."

§76-2-102, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
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(emphasis added)

If a person harbors a criminal mental state but does not translate
that state into a prohibited act there is no crime.

Likewise, if a person

does a wrongful act but without the required mental state, there is no
crime.

State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 1984).
The State prosecuted Haws under § 35-4-19 (a), Utah Code Annotated

1953, as amended.

That statute specifies the mental state necessary for

conviction of the crime of unemployment fraud.
(a)

Whoever

makes

a

It reads:

false

statement

or

representation knowing it to be false or knowingly
fails

to disclose

a material

fact,

to obtain or

increase any benefit or other payment... is guilty
of a Class A misdemeanor, (emphasis added)
§35-4-19 does not define the phrases "knc*/ing it to be false" or
"knowingly fails to disclose a material fact".

In fact, the unemployment

compensation statute does not define those phrases at all.
§

76-2-103

"krKSwingly".

of

the

Utah

Criminal

Code, hcwever, does

Presumably, this definition applies to §35-4-19(a).

According to §76-2-103, a person engages in conduct:
(2) knowingly, or with knowledge, with
respect

to

circumstances

his

conduct

surrounding

his

or

conduct

when he is aware of the nature of
conduct

to

or the existing circumstances.

his
A

person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to a result of his conduct
when he is aware that his conduct is

13

define

reasonably certain to cause the result,
(emphasis added)
A person acts "with knowledge" or 'Toiowingly" when he aware of
nature

of his

conduct.

the

He must be more than just aware of his conduct. He

must be aware of the nature

of his conduct.

If he is not aware that the

nature of his conduct is of a wrong or cnriminal nature, then he does not
have the mental state of "knowledge77 and cannot be guilty of an offense
requiring the existence of that mental state.
Thus, the presumption in civil unemployment fraud cases that the act
of making claims containing false statements is inherently fraudulent has
no place in a prosecution for the crime of unemployment fraud.

The

prosecution must prove the existence of the culpable mental state of
knowledge in the accused at the time of the culpable act by proof that the
accused knew he was acting in violation of the law.

IV. FOR THE PROSECUTION TO HS3VE THAT HAWS HAD
THE MENS REA OF KNOWLEDGE IT MUST PROVE MDRE THAN JUST WHAT
ANY CLAIMANT SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, IT MUST PROVE THAT HAWS ACTUALLY
KNEW HE WAS ACTING IN VIOLATION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT
CCMPENSATTON LAW
In the case at bar, the prosecution argued that on the basis of the
DES orientation procedure

in which Haws participated

and the simple

language of the biweekly claim cards that any claimant should have known to
report any work and earnings on the biweekly claim cards and therefore Haws
must have known to report his continuing work at his regular part time job
and knowingly did not do so.

The prosecution's argument found favor with

the Court, the Court finding that because Haws should
his

continuing

part-time

work
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(regardless

of

have known to report

what

any

departmental

representative told him) he did knew and committed fraud.

In effect, the

Court equated what DES believed any claimant should have realized or should
have been able to understand with what Haws actually did knew and
understood.
What

This was error.
DES believes

a

claimant

should

have

realized

or hew

a

reasonable person objectively should have understood questions on the biweekly claim forms does not qualify as knowledge in terms of a criminal
statute.

What does qualify is what the claimant himself knew and hew he

subjectively understood a question.

To illustrate, Haws refers the Court

to two civil unemployment fraud cases from other states.
In Hebert v.

State, 323 A.2d

1

(Maine

1974),

Hebert became

unemployed after working for a company for several years.

He filed a

series of claims with the Maine Employment Security Commission. Each claim
form

asked

employment.

questions concerning

the

claimant's

last or most recent

After filing the first claim, Hebert worked for a hotel for a

period of approximately two and one half months.

In subsequent claims, he

did not mention this short term ertployment with the hotel.
When

representatives

of

the

Commission

investigated,

Hebert

explained that he understood the question about his last ertployment to be
referring to his most recent substantial or long term employment, not short
term work.

His explanation did not prevail and the Commission pursued the

itatter under the state statute which permitted the Commission to disqualify
an individual from receiving benefits if "the claimant made a false
statement or representation knowing it to be false or knowingly fails to
disclose a material fact in his application to obtain benefits".
Hebert,

convinced

that

15

he

had

not

made

any

knowing

misrepresentation, pursued the Commission's adverse determination through
the Commission's appeals machinery, sought review in the local trial court
(which affirmed the Coramission) and eventually appealed to the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court.
The Supreme Judicial Court found the Commission had committed an
error of law which every level had subsequently ratified:
The Commission's error of law derives ... frcm
the

Commission's view

that under

[the statute

involved] a claimant is accountable on the basis of
an objective

assessment of the meaning of the

questions posed by the Commission for answer by the
claimant—i.e., the meaning which

a

reasonable

person would assign to the language rather than

that meaning which the particular
subjectively

claimant in

fact

understood to be the meaning.

As the English language is ccammonly used, an
answer to a question is said to be "false" ... when
the

person

who

answers

subjectively

intends

deception....
We are satisfied that in [the statute] the
Legislature intended precisely this common meaning
inporting a fully

subjective

approach to "falsity."

The conclusion is buttressed by the legislature's
express requirements that the claimant must "know"
that his statement is "false" and his "failure to
disclose a material fact" must be "knowing."
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Within the correct meaning of [the statute]
therefore, whether Hebert made a "false

statement

or

false

representation

knowingly

failed

knowing
to

it

disclose

to

be

a material

or
fact"

(emphasis supplied) depends. . . on hew Hebert

fact

subjectively

understood

the meaning of

words used In the Commission's question.
after

an

evaluation

of

Hebert's

in

the
Only

subjective

apprehension of the meaning of the question can a
proper determination be made as to whether Hebert's
answer was "knowingly false"—in the sense that in
accordance with Hebert/s own special understanding

of the question, he was subjectively
his answer was contrary to fact,
deception,

a

cognizant

that

thereby to be a

"lie."

Persistently throughout the evidence Hebert

asserted that his actual subjective

understanding

of the meaning of the Commission's question was
that he was being asked to inform the Ccxtimission of
his most recent substantial employment, the last
employment

at

which

substantial time."
refrained
credit
omitted

he

The

had

worked

Commission,

from reaching a decision

"for

any

however,

concerning

the

it would give this testimony of Hebert.

It

to

make a finding

of

whether or not Hebert subjectively
17

fact

concerning

understood

the

question

in

testimony.

the manner he was claiming
Instead,

the

finding of fact unnecessary,
the theory

that

Commission
because

in

held

irrelevant,

[the statute]

rendered

his
such
on

Hebert

chargeable objectively,

in terms of a reasonable

person's

of

understanding

question.

the

meaning

of

the

By this interpretation the Commission

committed error of law. (emphasis in original and
added)
323 A.2d 1 at 6.
In Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes. 99 Idaho 77, 589 P.2d 89 (Idaho
1979), the State of Idaho's Department of Employment claimed that a
recipient of unemployment benefits had refused an offer of suitable work
without good cause and had willfully failed to report a material fact (his
refusal of the offer) in order to obtain benefits.
In

August

of

unemployment benefits.

1975

Meyer

had

filed

for

and

began

receiving

In January or February of 1976, Skyline Mobile

Homes offered Meyer full-time employment.

When Meyer discovered that the

full-time employment offered would involve heavy traveling, Meyer declined
the offer.

He had earlier worked for Skyline in a job which had involved

much traveling.
of custody

Such extended absences had led to a divorce and the loss

of his two young sons.

Fearing the travel would again

jeopardize a second marriage and family life, Meyer declined Skyline's
offer.
As part of the unemployment process, Department of Employment
("DOE") required Meyer to complete weekly certification forms, one question
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of which was ''Were you offered any work during the week (either for that
week or any future date) which you refused?"

In corrpleting the DOE's

weekly certification form for the week of Skyline's offer, Meyer answered
"no" to the question,
A DOE claims examiner subsequently determined that Meyer had refused
an offer of suitable work without good cause and had willfully failed to
report a material fact in order to obtain benefits and required Meyer to
repay all the benefits he received as a result of his failure to report the
Skyline offer.
Meyer objected to the claims examiner's determination and a DOE
appeals examiner held a hearing.

Meyer indicated that he had not reported

his refusal of the Skyline offer in response to the question on the weekly
certification form because he understood the question to ask only whether
he had refused an offer of suitable

work.

Meyer testified that he

considered Skyline's offer of traveling service work unsuitable because
traveling had destroyed his first marriage and would certainly also disrupt
his second marriage and prevent him

frcm adequately caring

for his

children.
The DOE appeals examiner determined that Meyer had refused suitable
work without good cause and had willfully withheld a material fact to
obtain benefits.

Meyer appealed to the Industrial Commission.

The

Industrial Commission affirmed the two earlier decisions.
Meyer then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court on the ground that he
did not willfully

withhold a material fact.

The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the Commission had reached
its decision under an erroneous view of the law in that it had equated the
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claimant's gross negligence with the mental state of willfulness.
Court reversed the Gammission's determinations:
Meyer maintained throughout his testimony that ha
understood the question on the weekly certification
form to ask whether he had refused an offer of
suitable

work.

He explained that he had marked

"no" because he considered the traveling job with
Skyline

unsuitable

in

light

of

his

family

circumstances.
The examiner's findings reflect that he found
Meyer's testimony credible.

Despite finding that

Meyer had misunderstood the question on the weekly
certification form, the examiner concluded that
Meyer willfully failed to report his refusal of
work.

It seems clear that the appeals examiner

based his decision not
believed

the question

on what Meyer

asked, but rather

actually

on what the

examiner concluded Meyer should have understood
question

to

the

ask.

The court found the Industrial Commission based its
conclusion [that Meyer willfully withheld material
information] upon the notion that Meyer must be held
to knew that which he should have known throuc£i the
exercise of minimal care.

In effect, then, the

Commission may have assumed that gross negligence on
Meyer's part [satisfied the willfulness element of
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The

the statute.] (emphasis added)
589 P.2d 89 at 95, 96.
The Idaho Supreme Court then discussed what meaning should be
assigned to the word ''willfully'' as used in the statute and concluded that
the Legislature did not intend to disqualify those vftiose amission is

accidental "because of negligence,

mlsimderstanding

or other cause", but

only intended to disqualify those claimants who "purposely, intentionally,
consciously, or kncwingly fail to report a material fact". 589 P.2d 89 at
96.
In the case at bar, the prosecution attempted to shew that no
reasonable person would have understood the reporting requirement and the
questions on the claim cards as Haws did and tried to equate Haws7 lack of
attention or misunderstanding as knowing failure to disclose material
facts.

But as the courts in the Hebert and Mever cases recognized, the

fact that a claimant vftio may have lost all work perhaps should have knewn
to

report

any

new

work, whether

part-time

or

full-time, does not

automatically lead to the conclusion that a claimant in Haws' situation
should have known to report his ongoing part-time work or Haws himself
actually knew to report his regular ongoing part-time work and failed to do
so.

Ihe State presented little evidence as to Haws7 actual state of mind.

But Haws explained that he was mistaken.
of

his

employment

situation

and

Haws7 testimony was that because

his

conversation

with

the

DES

representative, he subjectively understood the process of reporting to
require him to report any new work he obtained but not the continuing work
at his part time job of which DES was aware and vrtiich he had been lead to
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believe was already being considered in his benefit amount.

V. FOR THE HtoSECOTION TO PROVE THAT HAWS HAD THE MENS REA OF
KNOWLEDGE, IT MUST PROVE MORE THAN THAT HAWS ENGAGED IN AN ACIJ
IT MUST PROVE THAT HAWS KNEW THAT HE WAS ACTING IN VIOIATICN
OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT IAW
Haws7 research has uncovered no Utah case which discusses what is
required to establish proof of the mental state of 'ToTewingly'' or "with
knowledge" in the context of a criminal prosecution under §35-4-19(a)4.
States

with

similar

unemployment

compensation

laws,

however,

have

interpreted their laws to require that similar mental states be proven by
more than just proof of the commission of a fraudulent act.
For example, in Division of Employment & Trainincr v. Industrial
Commission of Colorado, 706 P.2d 433 (Colo. App. 1985), a civil case, the
3

The Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide may possibly contribute to
such a mistaken understanding. The Claimant Guide presupposes that one
filing for unemployment benefits is not employed at all. See, for example,
page 5: "It is to your advantage to accept all work you can find
while
filing
a claim.
You can earn up to 30% of your weekly benefit amount
before any deduction will be made frcm your weekly check. All earnings
must be reported on the bi-weekly claim form even if the total is less than
30% of your weekly benefit amount. If you accept part-time
work you must
continue to demonstrate your availability for full-time work by making an
active work search each week." (emphasis added)
The Claimant Guide does not directly address the situation of
someone in Mr. Haws7 situation, who at the time he applies for benefits is
still working part-time. Given that ambiguity, it is certainly conceivable
that someone who files for unemployment benefits and who tells DES he is
still working part-time and who is told that the earnings therefrom will be
factored into his benefit amount, might conclude that he need not report
his ongoing work but need only report any other work, which is exactly vrtiat
Haws concluded and what he did.

4

Haws is informed that the great majority of prosecutions under § 354-19 (a) are plea bargained. This may help explain the apparent dearth of
cases addressing the issues in this brief.
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claimant had filled out an unemployment compensation form on a Thursday and
mailed

it the following Sunday.

During the intervening period, the

claimant had worked on a teitporary basis for his former employer.

He had

not amended the unemployment compensation form to shew this work or the
earnings therefrom.
When the Division discovered this failure to report it assessed the
claimant an overpayment penalty and a monetary fine. The claimant appealed
to the Industrial Commission which allowed collection of the overpayment
but disallowed the fine on the ground that the Division had to prove the
claimant's specific intent and had not done so.
The Division appealed, arguing it did not have to prove a culpable
mental state but only had to prove the act of making a false representation
or failure to disclose a material fact.
The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed.
statute implied a mental state of knowledge.

The Court held that

The Court also held that

specific proof of the mental state was required:
[W]e conclude that the culpable mental state which must
be established by the Division pursuant to [the
statute] is //kncwinglyl#. A person acts ,#knowingly,#
with respect to the proscribed conduct "when he is
aware that his conduct is of such nature," and a
person acts //knewir*gly" with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
practically certain to cause the result.
[W]e do not agree . . . that the requisite

culpable

mental state may be presumed from proof of the act
23

itself.

Where, as here, proscribed

conduct

consists of an act combined with a culpable mental
state,

the culpable mental state is just as much an

element of the proscribed conduct as is the act.
Although a culpable mental state may ordinarily be
inferred from circumstantial evidence, proof

of the

commission of the act does not create a presumption
that

the

requisite

mental

state

existed.

(emphasis added)
706 P. 2d 433 at 435.
Other states have interpreted their criminal unemployment fraud laws
to require proof of some element of intent and knowledge on the part of the
accused. For example, the California Unemployment Insurance Code provides:
(a) It is a misdemeanor to willfully make a false
statement or representation or knowingly fail to
disclose a material fact to obtain, increase,
reduce or defeat any benefit or payment...
One of the issues in People v. Louie, 158 Cal. App. 3d Supp.28, 205
Cal. Rptr. 247 (Cal. Sup. 1984), was what the prosecution was required to
prove to establish a violation of this section of the statute.
In Louie, the State had charged a medical doctor with violating the
above referenced section of the unemployment code. A special investigator
working undercover had tried to get the doctor to sign a form certifying
him as disabled.

The doctor eventually signed three such forms, but only

after extreme behavior by the undercover officer which convinced the doctor
that something was wrong with the man and that it would be in the man's
24

best interests to have him certified with a disability.

The court held

"the prosecution must prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
intent to defraud and
representation."

(2) the willful making of a false statement or

The court also held that if the accused acted without an

intent to defraud but in the good faith
justified,

(1) an

belief

that

his

conduct was

such would constitute a defense to the intent to defraud

element.

The court determined the trial court had failed to instruct the

jury that if the defendant possessed a good faith belief in the man's
disability he was not acting with the requisite intent to defraud and
reversed the conviction:
The evidence at bench does not point irresistibly
to the conclusion that appellant acted with the
required

fraudulent

intent.

Under

proper

instructions the jury could well have reasonably
acquitted him on the evidence presented.
205 Cal. Rptr. 247 at 258, 260.
States have also addressed the meaning of
of

administrative

or

criminal

prosecutions

establishing other social welfare programs.

|y

knowring,/ in the context

for

violation

of

laws

In Krauzer v. Farmland

Industries. 626 P. 2d 1223 (Kan App. 1981), for example, the issue was what
the prosecution had to prove to make out a case of fraud in a state
workers' compensation program.
The question before the court is simply, did
Mr. Krauzer knowingly misrepresent his physical
condition to Farmland?
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It is inherent in the term 'Tmcwingly" that some
degree of awareness be present.

Under the statute

a person who misrepresents the condition of his

health solely

by reason of accident or mistake and

without any awareness that he has done so cannot be
said to have knowingly made the misrepresentation,
(emphasis added)
626 P.2d 1223 at 1225, 1229.
See also United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221 (8th Cir. 1982), in
which

the meaning

of

'Tmewing'' was presented

in the

context

prosecution for the crime of fraudulently obtaining food staitps:
Defendant contends. • . that the word 'Tmowingly*
in [the statute] required the government to prove

that he knew that his actions were in violation
the law.

of

We must agree.
• • • .

The normal purpose of the criminal

law is to

condemn and punish conduct that society regards as
immoral. Usually the stigma of criminal conviction
is not visited upon citizens who are not morally to
blame because they did not know they were doing
wrong.
• . . .

Mthough the legislative history of [the statute]
is far from extensive, there is sufficient evidence
to suggest that Congress desired that no one be
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of

a

convicted of violating this section without

that he knew the unlawful character of his

proof

act.

. . . .

The

District

Court

correctly

stated

in

its

instructions that the purpose of including the word
,/

knowingly// in [the statute] is "to insure that no

one will be convicted for an act done because

mistake, or accident,

or other innocent

of

reason."

. . . .

This does not mean that the defendant must know, by
chapter and verse, the precise law and regulation
that forbid trafficking in food stamps for cash.

But he most knew that he was acting in violation
some law or

regulation.
. . .

[U]nder

the

permitted

of

to

instructions

.

given

convict, and

could

the

jury

have done

was
so

without finding that vtfien defendant bought food
staitps on the occasion charged in Count I, he knew
he was doing something that the law had forbidden.
The

conviction

on

Count

I

must

therefore

be

reversed, (emphasis added)
687 F.2d 1221 at 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228.
In

the

case

at

bar,

Haws'

explanation

as

to

his

subjective

understanding of what he was supposed to do based on his conversation with
a DES representative to do went uncontroverted.
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The trial court refrained

from making any finding as to \diether it believed Haws7 explanation and
testimony, yet the Court found Haws guilty.
Haws was mistaken.

This was error.

He subjectively understood the question, "Did

you work?" to mean "Did you work on any job other than the part-time work
which the DES ccatputer already shews you working?"
imderstanding was not created by Haws out of thin air.

Haws' mistaken
It resulted from a

conversation between Haws and a Department representative.
representative misunderstood Haws7 question.
representative's answer.

Maybe the

Maybe Haws misunderstood the

But there was no evidence to indicate that Haws

actually knew to report his part-time work and failed to do so.
Thus, in the case at bar, the evidence is insufficient to establish
that Haws actually knew that he was to report his regular ongoing part-time
work to DES.

The evidence universally points to the conclusion that Haws

was mistaken, the victim of misunderstanding or miscoDnraunication, on the
part

of

the

Departmental

representative

or

Haws

or

both.

This

misunderstanding does not qualify as the required mens rea.5
5

The view of the law which Haws proposes is not an invitation for
deliberate carelessness on the part of claimants nor an onerous obstacle in
the path of the prosecutor. As the Supreme Court of Idaho took pains to
elucidate in Meyer, supra, a claimant's mere assertion that there was a
caramunication gap of some kind should not preclude a finding upon
satisfactory evidence that a claimant did in fact willfully (or knewingly)
make a false statement or representation or willfully (or knewingly) fail
to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits. For exaitple, if a
claimant knew or thought it highly probable that he or she did not knew
what information a claim form question solicited but nevertheless
deliberately chose to respond without pursuing clarification such conduct
mic£it support a conclusion of willful falsehood or concealment. Or if the
claimant's explanation is inconsistent with his behavior, wildly improbable
or otherwise unworthy of belief, the fact finder may still find knowing
deception.
But itdscoranunication and mistakes do occur. To saddle someone with
a criminal record solely on the basis of a mistaken view of his
responsibilities based on a miscommunication or misunderstanding where
there was no proof of an intent to defraud and no knowledge as to the
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OONCXUSION
The trial court's verdict was clearly erroneous.

The trial court

held an erroneous view of What evidence could establish the presence of the
requisite mental state.

That erroneous view resulted in Haws' conviction

on less than adequate evidence.

A mistake has been made.

The State did

not establish that Haws actually knew to report his ongoing part-time work
at Bonneville Estates on the biweekly claim cards and knowingly did not do
so, by adequate evidence. Thus, the State did not satisfy the requirements
of §35-4-19 and the elements of the crime.

Accordingly, the current

conviction of Mr. Haws cannot stand and should be overturned.
Dated this Crfe

— d a y of May, 1989.
ROMNEY & OONDIE

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

criminal nature of his conduct is not just.
See also § 76-2-304, Utah Code Annotated, as amended:
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of
fact
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any
prosecution for that crime, (emphasis added)
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

A-l

Resmarks and Decision of Judge Gowans in declaring the verdict.

A-2

Ihe Judgment sought to be reviewed.

A-1
REMARKS AND DECISION OF JUDGE GOWANS IN DECIARING
THE VERDICT

CERTIFIED COPY
1

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

-oOo-

4

STATE OF UTAH,

S
6
7
8

Plaintiff,

Criminal No. 881010137MS

vs.
GLENN R. HAWS,
Defendant.

9

-oOo-

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 6th day of January, 1989,

12

the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the

13

Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, sitting as Judge in the above-named

14

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following

15

proceedings were had.

16

-oOo-

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY. SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

1

I

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

•

THE COURT:

*
5
6

Mr. Haws?

Mr. Haws, the Court has had an opportunity to review
all the documents that have been submitted as evidence and
I reviewed the other matters which have been provided for the
Court, and while the arguments as propounded by your attorney

8
9

are certainly appropriate and correct, and that is that there
J must be some—or the appropriate mental state; the Court feels,

10

after reviewing these documents, that you had access to and were

11

exposed to that you should have had that complete understanding,

12

13

J irrespective of what any individual may have said to you during
the course of your dealings with the Department.

14

Specifically, on Page 5, and let me just read that to

15

you:

16

while filing a claim, you can earn up to 30 percent of your

It is to your advantage to accept all work you can find

17

j weekly benefit amount, before any deduction will be made from

18

I your weekly check.

19

I in capitals, so that it's very apparent in the paragraph.

And then this phrase, and the word "all" is
ALL

20

earnings must be reported on a bi-weekly claim form, even if the

21

total is less than the 30 percent of your weekly benefit amount.

22

And then further on in the booklet, back on Page 21,

23

penalties for fraudulent claims.

24

it is a crime to misrepresent or withhold information to obtain

25

unemployment benefits.

The paragraph reads as follows:

Now, whether there was some miscommunicatic|

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

1

I between you and this person, either on your part or on her part,

2

• of course, the Court cannot answer, but it would appear the things

3

that you had been exposed to in this booklet, and there's another

*

phrase I wanted to read, and I think I jotted that down, let m e —

5

yes, on Page 1, the very first paragraph.

6

information you are required to know about your rights and

7

responsibilities while filing a claim.

8
9

This guide provides

Even after your discussions with individuals, with this
I individual, assuming all of that to be correct, and this person

10

informing you that your part-time work had already been construed

11

J or considered or evaluated in the benefit that you were receiving,

12

I it would appear from these three entries that the Court has read

13

from this booklet, that it would have—or should have been

14

perfectly clear to you that you must report that information for

15

future consideration.

16

And then as you would sign for your checks each week,

*7 I on this claim form, as was pointed out during the course of the
IB

proceedings, it is very specific again; number one, did you work,

19

and then if the answer to that is yes, then you must indicate

20

whether it was full-time, part-time, on call, et cetera, et cetera,

21

I

The Court does not find, Mr. Haws, that there could

22

have been any misunderstanding from these printed documents as to

23

what your requirements are.

24

guilty as charged.

25

I

Consequently, the Court finds you

Now, Mr. Holdsworth, would you wish the Court to impose
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY. SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

1

sentence at this time or at a later date, and would you wish a

2

pre-sentence report?

3

MR. HOLDSWORTH:

•

THE COURT:

5

MR. HOLDSWORTH:

6

THE COURT:

I would like a pre-sentence report.

All right.
And have sentencing at a later time.

All right.

We'll continue the matter then

7

for sentencing, that second week into February, Marlene, what date

8

are we using there, the 7th or 9th?

9

I

10

THE CLERK:

The 8th.

THE COURT:

The 8th?

All right.

H

February 8th, at 9:30 in the morning.

12

that?

Sentencing then

What kind of calendar is

13

THE CLERK:

DUI,

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

And Mr. Haws, my clerk will give to you a slip of paper

At 9:30 in the morning.

16

which will direct you to the probation department. Follow the

17

instructions on that paper , and then be back in my courtroom on

18

February 8th at 9:30.

19

All right.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

20
21
22

A P & P, Yes.

I

* * *

23
24
25
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY. SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

A-2

JUD3ENT SOUGHT TO EE REVIEWED
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the undersigned, Clerk of the Circuit Co'
Stale of
ht Salt UKC County. Salt Lake Department do hereby
ify that the an.w»xed ana foregoing ic a true and UM
y of an original document on file in my office as tucH
/itnefi£"mylVcl/^d^§a! df^spd gourt This T J ^ L
PAUL L VANCE, Clecj
Deputy

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE

vs.
Case No. 881007904MS
DOB 5/18/54

GLEN R. HAWS,
Defendant,

On January 3, 1989, before the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans,
appeared John Spikes, the attorney for the state and the
defendant appeared in person and by counsel, David J.
Holdsworth.
A bench trial was held and the case was taken under
advisement.
On January 6, 1989, the defendant was found guilty of
unemployment compensation fraud.
It is adjudged that the defendant is guilty of the offense
of unemployment compensation fraud and was sentenced February
8, 1989, as follows:
90 days jail, to be stayed on good behavior probation of 1
year; terms:
1.
2.
3.
4.

No further violations.
Continue on payment schedule to employment security
and remain current.
Report for booking process, then released.
Pay $250.00 fine by April 28, 1989. Fine may be
worked off.
DATED this Z | day of

(U'UV—
(li{l¥-

-r 1989/

BY THE COURT

JUDGE,

